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The Role of (Junk) Science in Wilderness Management: 
Lessons Learned in the Wake of Drakes Bay Oyster 
Company 
Julia Graeser* 
I. THE WILDERNESS ACT: THE PURPOSE, THE PROCESS, AND THE LEGAL
REGIME
II. POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE ESTABLISHMENT AND WILDERNESS
DESIGNATION
III. SCIENCE ENTERS THE SCENE
IV. THE SECRETARY’S MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: FINALITY AT LAST
V. SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT: DEFINITION AND RESPONSE
VI. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE SECRETARY’S DECISION
The term “wilderness” has long captured a tension deeply rooted in the 
American spirit.  It referred to the vast swaths of virgin territory to be settled 
and sold in the name of progress, while paradoxically also reflecting our 
unique connection with the natural lands that we, as a young nation, once 
had in such abundance.1  Over time, our relationship with wilderness took 
on spiritual, even transcendental, dimensions.  As we have transformed 
wilderness with people and industry, so too has wilderness transformed us 
with its awe-inspiring natural bounty.2   
“Wilderness” has also become a term of important societal and legal 
significance, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding California’s 
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013;
B.A., Indiana University, 2009.  I would like to thank Professor John Leshy for his
insights in shaping this Note and my most beloved family and friends for their
ongoing support.
1. Leshy, John, Contemporary Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2005). 
2. Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Wilderness in Context, 76
DENV. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1999).  For a more fully developed historical account of the 
wilderness preservation movement, see RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN 
MIND (4th ed. 2001). 
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largest oyster farm operation,3 Drakes Bay Oyster Company (“DBOC”), 
located about forty miles northwest of San Francisco in western Marin 
County.4  DBOC is situated within the Point Reyes National Seashore on 
lands that are owned in fee by the United States, administered by the 
National Park Service, and leased out primarily to local cattle ranchers and 
dairy farmers.5  More specifically, DBOC conducts its operations in Drakes 
Estero,6 a system of five fingerlike branching bays just north of Drakes Bay 
that Congress designated as “potential wilderness area” over forty years 
ago.7   
The question of whether DBOC should be allowed to continue 
operating on those lands after the expiration of its original lease has not 
been an easy one to answer.  As discussed in this article, the National Park 
Service (“Park Service”) complicated this question considerably with its 
haphazard use of science to justify what officials regarded from the 
beginning as a matter of national wilderness policy.8  The answer came on 
November 29, 2012, when Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Interior, issued a 
memorandum of decision announcing that the DBOC lease would not be 
renewed,9 and that Drakes Estero would be converted to the wilderness area 
3. Peter Fimrite, Scientists Side with Drakes Bay Oyster Farmer, S.F. CHRON., May 6,
2009, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Scientists-side-with-Drakes-Bay-oyster-
farmer-3242873.php. 
4. See NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [hereinafter DEIS] v (Sept. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/pore/parkmgmt/planning_dboc_sup_deis.htm. 
5. Id. at vi. For a closer look at the relationship between the area’s biological
abundance and its local industry and culture, see PAUL SADIN, MANAGING A LAND IN
MOTION: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE 19-25 (2007), 
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/pore/admin.pdf. 
6. Drakes Estero encompasses roughly 2,500 acres, and its watershed covers
approximately thirty-one square miles.  See DEIS, supra note 4, at vi. 
7. Congress had never used the term “potential wilderness” before October
1976 when it designated the 8,002 acres surrounding Drakes Estero as such, without 
providing any definition of the term in the statute.  See infra notes 42-51.  An Act to 
Designate Certain Lands in the Point Reyes National Seashore, California, as 
Wilderness, Amending the Act of September 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 538), as Amended (16 
U.S.C. 459c–6a), and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 94–544, § 1, 90 Stat. 2515 (1976). 
8. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of the Interior San Francisco Field Solicitor to
the Point Reyes National Seashore Superintendent [hereinafter DOI Memo] (Feb. 26, 
2004), http://www.mmc.gov/drakes_estero/pdfs/ltr_doi_opinion_22604.pdf. 
9. Memorandum of Decision from Secretary Kenneth Salazar, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, to Dir., Nat’l Park Serv. [hereinafter Salazar decision] 2 (Nov. 29, 2012), 
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that Congress had originally envisioned.10  This paper will tell this tale from 
the beginning of American wilderness protection to what appears to be the 
end of DBOC,11 and explain how each reflects and relates to the other.   
Among the many lessons to be learned from the story, one theme runs 
throughout—the use and misuse of science in an effort to protect our 
wilderness.  While a critique of the Park Service’s methodology is in order, 
the decision itself was laudable.  Most importantly, it reflected the agency’s 
responsibility to be transparent about the reasons underlying its decisions. 
Because of the Park Service’s reliance on scant science and opaque dealings, 
the Secretary’s decision is remarkable not for the actual conclusion reached, 
but for the reasons given to support it.  Salazar based the decision on 
plainly stated policy judgments, which recognized existing scientific 
uncertainties12 and reflected a difficult choice between different but equally 
legitimate public values.13  
I. The Wilderness Act: The Purpose, the Process, and the
Legal Regime
Following nine years of deliberation and sixty-five different bills,14
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964 (hereinafter “the Act”).15  
Though the battle was primarily waged by a so-called “preservationist elite” 
fighting against dominant economic interests, the Act’s victory represented 
a widespread change in public opinion about the importance of protecting 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-salazar-issues-decision-on-point-
reyes-national-seashore-permit.cfm.  
10. Id. at 5, 7.
11. On February 25, 2013, the Ninth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s emergency
motion for an injunction pending appeal of the District Court’s denial of preliminary 
injunction, set to be heard in May of 2013, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et 
al., No. 13-15227 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://cdn.ca9. 
uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/02/25/13-15227_order_granting_injunction_pe 
nding _appeal_and_expediting_calendaring.pdf.  (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).  For 
more information on the current litigation, see infra notes 127-131.  
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 6 (“I am aware that allowing DBOC’s existing authorizations to expire
by their terms will result in dislocation of DBOC’s business and may result in the loss 
of jobs for the approximately 30 people currently employed by DBOC.”). 
14. Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honrold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 251 (1988). 
15. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 1-7, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006)). 
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our yet undeveloped areas.16  The Act created the National Wilderness 
Preservation System with over 9.1 million acres that had already been 
classified by the U.S. Forest Service,17 and provided that only Congress could 
add to the system by making future designations.18  Since its creation, the 
National Wilderness Preservation System has grown almost every year to 
encompass more land than the size of California, approximately 5% of the 
entire United States.19  
In outlining the purposes of the Act, Congress articulated goals that 
are interrelated but conceptually distinct.20  The Act was intended to first 
protect existing wilderness lands from “expanding settlement and growing 
mechanization,” and second, to preserve them “for the use and enjoyment of 
the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for 
future use and enjoyment as wilderness.”21  Legislative history indicates, 
however, that it was not just preservation for its own sake that provided the 
necessary impetus.  Preserving opportunities for recreation and scientific 
study in wild areas were also primary motives.22  Additionally, at least one 
scholar has argued that another goal of the Act was to accommodate select 
local and commercial interests.23 
The Act bars most commercial enterprise, permanent and temporary 
roads, and motorized vehicles and equipment from designated wilderness 
areas.24  Furthermore, the Act withdrew wilderness areas from consideration 
for mineral appropriation and leasing.25  But Congress had to accommodate 
the communities and industries already present in the areas designated as 
wilderness, and commercial activity was therefore not prohibited across the 
16. Delbert V. Mercure, Jr. & William M. Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of
Congressional Compromise, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47 (Richard A. Cooley & 
Geoffrey Wandesfore-Smith eds., 1970). 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982); see also Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 251.
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (“A recommendation of the President for
designation as wilderness shall become effective only if so provided by an Act of 
Congress”). 
19. Leshy, supra note 1, at 1.
20. Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 279.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
22. Rohlf & Honrold, supra note 14, at 255-256.
23. Id. at 258.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(c) (“Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and
subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise . . . within 
any wilderness area designated by this chapter”). 
25. Id. § 4(d)(3) (“Commercial services may be performed within [] wilderness
areas . . . to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the 
recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”). 
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board.26  The statute’s principal management directive is found in section 
4(b), which affirmatively requires an administering agency27 to preserve the 
pristine character of designated wilderness areas, subject to exceptions set 
forth in later provisions.28  Section 4(c) lists the type of activities and objects 
to be banned from wilderness areas, including roads, motorized vehicles and 
equipment, permanent structures, and commercial enterprises.29   
However, an administering agency may permit commercial services in 
wilderness areas pursuant to section 5 when “proper for realizing the 
recreational or other wilderness purposes.”30  For example, established uses 
of aircraft or motorboats may be permitted,31 as well as other commercial 
services necessary for valid wilderness pursuits.32  In contrast, other 
exceptions protect existing private rights that the agency is bound to 
recognize.33  Especially important to a ranching community like Point Reyes 
is the Act’s allowance of continued livestock grazing, where previously 
established, subject to reasonable regulation.34  
26. Id.
27. When Congress designates an area for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System, the federal agency with jurisdiction over the area 
immediately prior to the designation continues to manage it.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). 
28. The requirements of section 4(b) apply “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this chapter.”  Id. 
29. Section 4(c) provides in full: “Except as specifically provided for in this
chapter, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial 
enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this 
chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area for the purpose of the this chapter (including measures 
required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), 
there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or 
motor boats, no land of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no 
structure or installation within any such area.”  Id. § 1133(c).   
30. Id. § 1133(d).
31. See id. § 4(d)(1).
32. See id. § 4(d)(6).
33. See id. § 4(c) (“subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial
enterprise . . .”) (emphasis added).  For a detailed description of the Act’s exceptions 
to prohibited uses in designated wilderness areas, see Nell Green Nylem, Elisabeth 
Long, Mary Loum, Heather Welles, Dan Carlin, Brynn Cook, & Sage Adams, Will 
Wilderness be Diluted in Drakes Bay?, 39 ECOLOGY LAW CURRENTS 46, 51 (2012), 
http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2012/currents39-05-greennylen-2012-0826.pdf.  
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
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The Act contains more significant exceptions as well, which reflect the 
major political compromise required to successfully pass the Act.35  For 
example, the President has open-ended authority to approve reservoirs and 
major water works, power projects, and “other facilities needed in the public 
interest.”36  The Act also provided for a twenty-year window in which hard-
rock mining companies could stake new mining claims and the Secretary of 
the Interior could issue new oil, gas, and coal leases in national forest 
wilderness areas.37  Despite the Act’s overarching preservationist mandate, 
these exceptions demonstrate the significant amount of discretion afforded 
to the executive branch, on which wilderness protection would largely 
depend. 
II. Point Reyes National Seashore Establishment and
Wilderness Designation
In 1962, Congress established the Point Reyes National Seashore (“the
Seashore”) as a new type of operating unit within the national park system.38  
Seeking to preserve the peninsula’s agricultural traditions, Congress 
included a large “pastoral zone” within the Seashore to accommodate lease 
agreements with existing dairy farmers and ranchers.39  There was 
subsequently a great deal of controversy over the Park Service’s plans to 
develop the area for tourism.40  It was not long after the Act was passed that 
local residents and environmental groups began pushing for the heightened 
protection that could only be assured through congressional designation as 
wilderness.41   
In 1976, Congress designated 25,370 acres of the Seashore as 
wilderness and identified another 8,003 acres (including Drakes Estero) as 
“potential wilderness” in Public Law 94-567.42  No such category existed in 
35. Mercure & Ross, supra note 16, at 58 (“[I]n the fall of 1963 it became
obvious to the preservations that time and the realities of congressional power were 
against them and that it was better to get some protection rather than none at all.  It 
was also recognized that while they had to invest huge amounts of money in an 
attempt to arouse the public, the opposition had friends of long standing in 
Congress who could block the measure forever.”); see also Leshy, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
37. Id. § 1133(d)(3).
38. See Pub. L. No. 94–544, § 1, 90 Stat. 2515 (1976); see also SADIN supra note 5,
109-110.
39. Pub. L. No. 87-657, § 4, 76 Stat. 538 (1962).
40. SADIN, supra note 5, at 165-168.
41. Id. at 169-170.
42. Pub. L. No. 87-657, 76 Stat. 538 (1962).
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the Wilderness Act of 1964,43 and this was the first time Congress had used 
the term, though it included no definition within the text of the statute.44  
Accompanying Public Law 94-567 was a House Report stating that areas 
designated as potential wilderness “will be essentially managed as 
wilderness, to the extent possible, with the efforts to steadily continue to 
remove all obstacles to the eventual conversion of these lands and waters to 
wilderness status.”45  Public Law 94-567’s Senate Report added that Drakes 
Bay would achieve full wilderness status “when the Federal government 
gains full title to these lands and when non-conforming uses and/or 
structures are eliminated.”46   
Although the Park Service has not promulgated official regulations, it 
has adopted internal management policies that define potential wilderness 
areas as “lands that are surrounded by or adjacent to lands proposed for 
wilderness designation but that do not themselves qualify for immediate 
designation due to temporary, nonconforming, or incompatible 
conditions.”47  These lands must be managed as wilderness to the extent 
that existing nonconforming conditions allow, with non-conforming uses 
phased out “as soon as practicable.”48  This policy applies equally to 
congressionally designated potential wilderness areas as to undesignated 
potential wilderness areas—that is, those that the agency has merely 
recommended for designation because of their wilderness characteristics.49  
In either instance, the Park Service policy is that all nonconforming uses are 
to “be eliminated as soon as practicable.”50   
The 1976 statute contains language that is more passive.  It states only 
that potential wilderness additions would become designated wilderness 
when “all uses thereon prohibited by the Widerness Act. . . . have ceased.”51  
DBOC supporters argue that, even without DBOC, this is not the case in 
43. Id.
44. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1680, at 3 (1976).
46. S. REP. NO. 94-1357, at 7 (1976).
47. NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES, 6.2.2.1 (2006) (6.2.2.1 Potential
Wilderness), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2006.pdf. 
48. Id., 6.3.1 (Wilderness Resource Management, General Policy).
49. Id. For a fuller discussion of the differences between designated and
undesignated potential wilderness areas, see Nylem et al., supra note 33, at 54. 
50. NAT’L PARK SERV., Director’s Order 41: Wilderness Preservation and
Management § B(3)(d)(vi) (1999), http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/DOrders/DOrder 
41.html.
51. S. REP. NO. 94-1357, at 7 (1976).
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Drakes Estero because of California’s retained rights to fishing and mining.52  
They highlight the “full title” language included in Public Law 94-567’s 
Senate Report to assert that full wilderness conversion is inappropriate.53  
Although the notice published in the Federal Register converting Drakes Bay to 
full wilderness declared Drakes Estero to be “entirely in federal ownership,”54 
DBOC argues this statement cannot be true given California Department of 
Fish and Game’s intention to continue leasing Drakes Estero for shellfish 
cultivation.55  Because of this inconsistency, DBOC supporters contend that 
the area’s conversion to full wilderness actually contravenes congressional 
intent.56   
Wilderness supporters consider the congressional intent more broadly, 
in light of the statute’s basic purposes and strict prohibitions.  A piece 
written by a group of law students at UC Berkeley entitled “Will Wilderness be 
Diluted in Drakes Bay?” carefully outlines the twenty-nine congressionally 
designated potential wilderness areas and describes in detail the 
nonconforming uses thereon.57  Compared to other nonconforming uses, the 
authors determine that “DBOC operations constitute a highly unusual 
nonconforming use” and, thus, that an extension for a “non-recreation-
focused commercial enterprise” would “be unique and without precedent.”58  
Not only would such an extension lack precedent, it would “contravene the 
designating legislation’s intent, the Wilderness Act’s purpose and 
substance, and NPS’s own management guidance.”59 
What is incontrovertible is that at the time that Congress passed the 
Point Reyes Wilderness Act, the area was already home to dairy farmers, 
ranchers, and shellfish farmers.60  Mariculture entrepreneurs had been 
operating in Point Reyes since the early 1900s.61  After the establishment of 
the Seashore, a decade-long negotiation ensued between the Park Service 
and Charles Johnson, the owner of the locally based Johnson Oyster 
52. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 26, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et
al., No. 13-15227 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2013); see also Declaration in Support of 
Appellant’s Motion (Ex. 9) (CFGC letter stating that it “has clearly authorized” 
DBOC’s shellfish cultivation “through at least 2029” in “the proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction.”). 
53. Id.
54. 77 Fed. Reg. 71826 (Dec. 4, 2012).
55. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 52, at 27.
56. Id. at 26.
57. See Nylem et al., supra note 33.
58. Id. at 56-57.
59. Id. at 63.
60. See SADIN, supra note 5, 19-25.
61. See DEIS, supra note 4, at v.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
315 
Company.62  Johnson sold five acres to the Park Service but retained a forty-
year reservation of use and occupancy (RUO) allowing him to continue 
operations on one and a half acres.63  This RUO provided Johnson  
[and] its successors and assigns, a terminable right to use and 
occupy the . . .  property . . . for a period of 40 years for the 
purpose of processing and selling wholesale and retail oysters 
[and] seafood . . . the interpretation of oyster cultivation to the 
visiting public, and residential purposes reasonably 
incidental. . . .  Upon expiration of the reserved term, a special 
use permit may be issued for the continued occupancy of the 
property and the herein described purposes.”64 
It is the last sentence of the RUO that would become the source of 
considerable debate.  
Over thirty years later, in late 2004, a local rancher named Kevin Lunny 
purchased Johnson Oyster Company’s assets and renamed the operation 
Drakes Bay Oyster Company.  With the purchase, Lunny assumed the 
remainder of the forty-year onshore RUO, considered a deeded property 
interest, and a special use permit (SUP) for a septic leach field and well on 
an adjacent property, set to expire in 2008.65  Despite the RUO’s renewal 
clause, the Park Service was transparent about the fact that renewing the 
RUO was against the agency’s management policies as well as the 
congressional wilderness mandates to which it was bound.66  At the time, 
Lunny was aware of the Park Service’s position that the RUO would 
terminate without renewal, after which no SUP would be granted.67 
The SUP that was signed in 2008, which was to expire concurrently with 
the RUO, allowed DBOC to continue its onshore motorboat operations and 
maintain 142 acres of shellfish beds within Drakes Estero.68  As a part of the 
negotiations surrounding the SUP, Lunny agreed to clean and update the 
oyster operation to conform to existing “state of the art” environmental 
standards.69  He reportedly spent more than $300,000 on renovations: a new 
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 19, 77-78.
66. DOI Memo, supra note 8.
67. Id.; see also Oyster Farming in Drakes Bay (KQED Public Radio, hosted by Scott
Shafer, June 30, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 KQED broadcast], http://www.kqed. 
org/a/forum/R906301000. 
68. DEIS, supra note 4, at vi.
69. 2009 KQED broadcast, supra note 67.
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septic system, demolition of existing buildings that were not up to 
environmental standards, permitting water systems, and hauling out 1800 
cubic yards of debris left behind by the Johnson family operation.70 
As the largest oyster farm in California,71 DBOC produces roughly a 
third of the state’s supply of shellfish72 and regularly employs around thirty 
people at a time.73  Since 2004, it has expanded to produce approximately 
460,000 pounds of shucked oysters and one million Manila clams each 
year.74  To accomplish this, nearly 1,000 oyster bags have been distributed 
throughout the estuary.75  The company also uses oyster racks, some of 
which are located outside the area permitted by the SUP, and employs small 
motorboats and trucks that run at least once a day.76  Since 2007, the 
California Coastal Commission (“CCC”) has taken repeated action against 
DBOC for various state law violations including unpermitted development 
and discharge of marine debris.77  These actions culminated on February 6, 
2013, when the California Coastal Commission voted 8-0 to implement its 
most recent Cease and Desist order.78  Lunny maintains that he applied for 
the necessary coastal development permit in 2005 and had been in the 
70. Id.
71. Fimrite, supra note 3.
72. Lunny stated in an interview that the often-quoted 40% figure does not
come DBOC, rather from California Fish and Game.  He neither supported nor denied 
its accuracy.  See Drakes Bay Oyster Company Sues to Stay (KQED Public Radio, hosted by 
Michael Krasny, Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 KQED broadcast], http://www. 
kqed.org/a/forum/R201212050900. 
73. Paul Payne, Oyster farm’s closure could lead to higher oyster prices,
PRESSDEMOCRAT.COM, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20121205/ 
ARTICLES/121209773/1350?p=1&tc=pg. 
74. Fimrite, supra note 3.
75. DEIS, supra note 4, at 61, 67.
76. The 2008 SUP includes a harbor seal protocol that restricts operations,
including boat travel, in certain areas.  Though the Park Service issued a letter to 
DBOC in January of 2013 asserting that their actions violated the plain language of 
this provision, DBOC has maintained that its operations are not incompliant.  See 
NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT [hereinafter FEIS] 100 (Nov. 20 2012), available at http://parkplan 
ning.nps.gov/document.cfm?parkID=333&projectID=33043&documentID=50651. 
77. For more information, see the California Coastal Commission website,
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/. 
78. A video of the Feb. 6 public hearing is available at mms://media.cal-
span.org/calspan/Video_Files/CCC/CCC_13-02-07/CCC_13-02-07.wmv [beginning at 
2:09:38] (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); see also Cease and Desist Order No. CCC 13-CD-01 
(Nov. 29, 2007), http://documents.coastal.ca.gov/reports/2007/12/W6-12-2007.pdf.   
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process of seeking to obtain that permit ever since.79  In Lunny’s view, the 
same activists who have fought the lease renewal from the beginning are the 
ones who also alleged the CCC violations80“[w]e know we’re under the 
microscope,” Lunny stated,81 “[t]he last thing we’re doing is violating any 
rules.”82 
III. Science Enters the Scene
The “microscope” that Lunny describes is the result of a debate that
began in 2006 when local newspapers reported various scientific studies 
suggesting the DBOC had only a negligible effect on the Estero ecosystem.83  
In response, the Park Service published on its website a report entitled 
“Drakes Estero: A Sheltered Wilderness Estuary” (“Sheltered Wilderness report”) 
written by a senior Park Service scientist, Dr. Sarah Allen.84  Allen’s report 
claimed that the oyster farm damaged eelgrass beds, reduced the number of 
harbor seals, potentially hastened the spread of nonnative species, and 
increased sedimentation in the estuary.85  Of greatest concern was the Park 
Service’s allegation that DBOC was solely to blame for an 80% decline in the 
local harbor seal population.86  
It is hard to imagine that anyone in the Park Service could have 
anticipated the controversy soon to follow.  Dr. Corey Goodman, a local 
neurobiologist and member of the National Academy of Sciences, was 
shocked by the report and immediately requested to review the data. 
Jonathan Jarvis, National Park Service Director of Pacific West Region, 
denied access to the data citing “deliberative process privilege.”  Goodman 
then went to Senator Dianne Feinstein with his concerns and, a month later, 
in July of 2007, the two went to Point Reyes to discuss the problem with Park 




83. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: POINT
REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE 7 (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter INS. GEN. REPORT] (citing Peter 
Jamison, Drakes Bay Oyster Company Has Little Impact on Estero, PT. REYES LIGHT, May 16, 
2006), available on the Department of Interior website, http://www. 
doi.gov/oig/reports/index.cfm. 
84. DRAKES ESTERO: A SHELTERED WILDERNESS, POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE
(May 11, 2007) [hereinafter SHELTERED WILDERNESS], http://mmc.gov/drakes_estero/ 
pdfs/nps_swilderness_51107.pdf. 
85. INS. GEN. REPORT, supra note 83, at 10-16.
86. Id. at 16.
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Service officials.87  Feinstein directed Jarvis to take down the report from the 
website and turn over the data upon which it had relied in reaching its 
conclusions.88   
After Feinstein’s summit meeting, the Park Service promptly removed 
the Sheltered Wilderness report from its website and published a 
“Clarification of Law, Policy, and Science on Drakes Estero” (“Clarification report”) 
two months later.89  The Clarification report acknowledged “several 
discrepancies” and revised its statements on DBOC’s ecological impacts.90  
The revised report, however, did not include contributions from peer 
reviewers.91  Although the Park Service purported to retract its claims against 
DBOC in the Clarification report, it did so with conspicuous subtlety.  Lunny 
and Goodman, of course, considered it “intentionally misleading,” and 
claimed the Park Service had “buried these retractions in the middle of 
paragraphs and sections that appeared to the casual reader to be a 
validation of the [Park Service’s] claims and a rebuttal to Goodman.”92 
An example of this reporting tactic appears in the Park Service’s 
treatment of the harbor seal data, previously reported as an 80% decline 
resulting from DBOC operations.  The data NPS turned over to Goodman 
showed that only one of the eight subsites studied had declined by 80% in 
2007, and that subsite was actually in the designated wilderness area, far away 
from the oyster farm, and the decline was most likely attributable to park 
87. Id. at 17-18.
88. Id. at 7.
89. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CLARIFICATION OF LAW, POLICY, AND SCIENCE ON DRAKES 
ESTERO (Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter CLARIFICATION], http://www.npca.org/assets/pdf/ 
nps_drakes_estero.pdf; see also Ins. Gen. Report, supra note 83, at 16. 
90. Id. at 16; see also COMM. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR SHELLFISH MARICULTURE AND THE
EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN DRAKES ESTERO, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHELLFISH 
MARICULTURE IN DRAKES ESTERO, POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIFORNIA 72-79 
(2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (comparing the Clarification with earlier versions of 
the Sheltered Wilderness report). 
91. Letter from Dr. Corey Goodman to Ken Salazar 7 (May 16, 2009) (“Dr. Peter
Gleick, NAS member, MacArthur Fellow, Founder of the Pacific Institute, and well-
known environmentalist, reviewed Jarvis’ “Clarification” document, and wrote: “… 
this NPS ‘rebuttal’ … acknowledges very clearly that the NPS was wrong and 
Goodman was right, over and over and over again, but couched in language that 
pretends the opposite.”), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/02/13/document_ 
gw_02.pdf. 
92. Letter from Cause of Action to Doris Lowery, Nat’l Park Serv. Washington
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visitors.93  Nevertheless, the Clarification report stated merely that “[m]ore 
focused analyses are required to determine if oyster operations are affecting 
seal distribution and productivity within Drakes Estero.”94  
Those reports were just the beginning of the scrutiny soon to follow. 
Senator Feinstein petitioned the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a 
formal, independent National Research Counsel (“NRC”) review,95 and Lunny 
requested that the Interior Department conduct an investigation.  The 
Inspector General then interviewed seventy-eight individuals, searched 
Seashore offices with a Computer Crimes Unit, and reviewed over 1,100 
documents and e-mails.96 
In a July 2008 report, the Inspector General concluded that Seashore 
officials made “concerted attempts” to find environmental harm and, in 
doing so, had “misrepresented” their scientific research.97  For example, the 
Wilderness Report stated that DBOC oysters were “the primary source” of 
sedimentation in Drakes Estero, when in fact outside studies showed only 
that oyster waste was a factor in sedimentation in the specific water bodies 
where the studies were conducted.98  Similarly, the Park Service claimed that 
the oyster racks “severely restricted” eelgrass growth, although available 
research showed “no pronounced impacts” on eelgrass.99  The Inspector’s 
report also highlighted Dr. Allen’s actions as lead scientist, such as 
withholding information contrary to characterizations later made in the 2007 
Sheltered Wilderness report and deleting e-mails that should have been 
released in response to multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
requests.100  The report presented the Inspector’s factual findings without 
making any subjective judgments about the appropriateness of the officials’ 
conduct.  This task was apparently left to Mary Bomar, the Director of the 
Park Service, to whom the report was directed “for whatever administrative 
action she deems appropriate.”101 
The NRC accepted Feinstein’s request for review and commenced a 
panel of experts to “assess the scientific basis” for the Park Service’s public 
presentations and Sheltered Wilderness report.”102  In May of 2009, the 
93. Fimrite, supra note 3; see also NRC REPORT, supra note 82, at 4-5, 77.
94. CLARIFICATION, supra note 89, at 13.
95. NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 18-19.
96. INS. GEN. REPORT, supra note 83, at 5-6.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 2 (Allen “was privy to information contrary to her characterization[s]
. . . and did nothing to correct the information before its release to the public.”). 
101. Id. at 1.
102. NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 2.
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NRC’s report was released.  It found a “lack of strong scientific evidence” that 
oyster farming had major adverse ecological effects on the Estero.103  
Moreover, it found that there was insufficient data to reach any conclusions 
about impacts to harbor seals or other wildlife, and reported that oysters, 
which have a beneficial localized filtering effect, could enhance overall 
ecosystem services in the Estero.104  As for the Park Service’s conduct, the 
NRC panel concluded that the Sheltered Wilderness report interpreted 
existing science in a manner that “exaggerated the negative and overlooked 
potentially beneficial effects” of the oyster culture operation.105  The NRC 
found “several instances” where the Park Service “selectively presented, over-
interpreted, or misrepresented” the available science on potential impacts.106  
Media coverage of the report varied.  Local news sources painted the 
committee’s conclusions in adversarial terms, while both DBOC and 
Seashore officials seemed to consider the report an exoneration.107  
Seashore officials also criticized the NRC’s report and formally challenged 
many of its findings.108  By and large, however, the hyperbole surrounding 
the controversy and the weight of the decision cannot be overstated.109  
Local environmental advocates, scholars, and laypeople argued that renewal 
of the DBOC lease would jeopardize the wilderness system as a whole.110  
103. Id. at 6, 86.  The report generally accepted the data as presented in the
Clarification but highlighted two major weaknesses: First, it had over-interpreted 
incomplete harbor seal disturbance data and, second, it did not recognize an 
ecological baseline where native oysters played a historical role in structuring the 
estuary’s ecosystem. 
104. Id. at 2, 68-69, 82.
105. Id. at 3, 73.
106. Id. at 72-73.
107. Fimrite, supra note 3 (reporting that oyster farm supporters “claimed
victory,” and that the report is “seen as vindication for the oyster company”). 
108. Dr. John G. Dennis, Comment on the NRC REPORT, on behalf of the NAT’L 
PARK SERVICE (June 16, 2009), available at http://mmc.gov/drakes_estero/pdfs/comm_ 
dennis_nas_rpt.pdf. 
109. Felicity Barringer, A Park, an Oyster Farm and Science: Epilogue, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/a-park-an-oyster-farm-and-
science-epilogue/  (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (“The hyperbole accompanying the 
debate over the site’s future was bewilderingly grandiose.”). 
110. Id.; see also Nylem et al., supra note 33, at 64-65 (“This outcome, and its
likely repetition across the country, would both harm local wilderness values and 
chip away at the integrity of the Wilderness Act itself.”). 
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Meanwhile, supporters of DBOC alleged widespread corruption, and even 
conspiracy, among high-level Park Service officials.111 
On May 5, 2009, the day the NRC report was released, Senator 
Feinstein sent a letter to Interior Secretary Ken Salazar about the “troubling 
and unacceptable” exaggerations made by the Park Service.112  A month later, 
Feinstein succeeded in attaching a rider to the Senate Interior Department 
appropriations.113  The rider provided that: “[N]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue a special 
use permit with the same terms and conditions as the existing 
authorization, except as provided herein, for a period of 10 years from 
November 30, 2012.”114   
The rider known now as section 124 required the Secretary to “take into 
consideration” the NRC report regarding maricultural best practices in 
making his decision.115  Finally, section 124 expressly foreclosed its 
application in any other wilderness area and disclaimed any precedential 
force for the decision.116 
The rider was supported largely on the basis of the “bad science” 
allegations.117  Just the year before, in 2008, Feinstein had proposed a rider 
to extend the lease by ten years but was unsuccessful.118  The first version of 
the 2009 bill provided for automatic extension, but when the head of the 
CCC came forward with details of DBOC’s regulatory violations, Senator 
Feinstein changed the bill to merely grant the Secretary discretion to extend 
the lease “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”119 
The Park Service subsequently undertook an environmental review 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to evaluate the 
111. See Jane Gyorgy, Oyster Zone Blog, http://oysterzone.wordpress.com/ (last
visited Dec. 17, 2012); see also The Framing of an Oyster Farm (Visual Record, Oct. 28, 
2012), http://vimeo.com/52331881 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  
112. Ian Fein, Reassessing the Role of the National Research Council: Peer Review, Political
Tool, or Science Court?, 99 CAL. L. REV. 465, 494 (2011) (describing the history of the 
rider). 
113. See Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 124, 123 Stat. 2932 (2009). 
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id. (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to have any application to
any location other than Point Reyes National Seashore; nor shall anything in this 
section be cited as precedent for management of any potential wilderness outside 
the Seashore.”). 
117. See Fein, supra note 112, at 502–04.
118. Id.; see also Fimrite, supra note 3.
119. See Fein, supra note 112, at 502–04.
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effects of issuing an SUP to DBOC.120  The draft environmental impact 
statement (“DEIS”), published in March of 2011, found that DBOC has a 
“major impact” on the soundscape, a “major impact” on wilderness, and an 
“adverse impact” on harbor seals, birds, and visitors’ recreational 
experience.121  These findings have been peer reviewed multiple times, and 
still uncertainty lingers.  In 2011, Congress directed the National Academy of 
Science to conduct another study, this time assessing “the validity of the 
science underlying the DEIS.”122  The NAS assembled another panel, which 
determined that the Park Service’s findings were uncertain at best, given that 
the Park Service had little primary data on which to base the DEIS.123  Of the 
eight resource categories examined, the projected impact levels had 
moderate to high levels of uncertainty, such that it would be “equally 
reasonable” to find lower impacts in many of these categories.124  The 
Department of the Interior also commissioned an outside review of the DEIS 
by Atkins North America.125  Although the reviewers identified minor “data 
gaps” and “factual errors,” they ultimately found “no fundamental flaw with 
the larger scientific underpinning of the DEIS.”126 
On November 20, 2012, the final environmental impact statement 
(“FEIS”) was released online, nine days before the Secretary’s November 29, 
2012, decision, without publishing a notice in the Federal Register.127  DBOC 
supporters maintain that the FEIS did not comply with NEPA’s procedural 
120. See DEIS, supra note 4, at iii (“The purpose of this document is to use the
NEPA process to engage the public and evaluate the effects of issuing a SUP . . . [to 
DBOC]. The results of the NEPA process [i.e., the Final EIS] will be used to inform 
the decision of whether a new SUP should be issued to DBOC for a period of 10 
years.”); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 65, 373 (Oct. 22, 2010) (“Pursuant to [NEPA], the 
National Park Service is preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the 
Drakes Bay Oyster Company Special Use Permit”).  For more information on NEPA, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).      
121. NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 12.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 112-331, at 1057 (2011).
123. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT 
(Mar. 2012) [hereinafter 2012 NRC Report], available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog.php?record_id=13461. 
124. Id. at 3.
125. See ATKINS NORTH AMERICA, REPORT ON PEER REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE USED IN
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE’S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DRAKES BAY 
OYSTER COMPANY SPECIAL USE PERMIT (Mar. 2012), available at http://www. 
doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=284844. 
126. Id. at 8.
127. See FEIS, supra note 78.
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requirements.128  In furtherance of this claim, they highlight the Park 
Service’s changed interpretation of its responsibilities under NEPA.129  
IV. The Secretary’s Memorandum of Decision: Finality at
Last
On November 29, 2012, after much anticipation, Secretary Ken Salazar
announced the DBOC lease would be allowed to expire, thereafter 
converting Drakes Estero to full wilderness status.130  The Secretary’s 
memorandum of decision expressly interprets section 124 as exempting the 
Secretary from the requirements of NEPA.131  Salazar explained that his 
decision was not based on scientific data, but “on matters of law and 
policy.”132  The two principal considerations were (1) the explicit terms of the 
1972 conveyance, which after much bargaining guaranteed no more than 40-
years of continued occupancy; and (2) Park Service policy regarding 
commercial use of wilderness land and nonconforming uses of potential 
wilderness, fashioned in conformance with Wilderness Act of 1964 and the 
Point Reyes Wilderness Act of 1976.133  
Although the Secretary conceded that “scientific methodology 
employed by the NPS . . . generated much controversy and ha[s] been the 
subject of several reports,”134 the decision was otherwise silent on the issue 
of scientific misconduct.  There was little reason to tread upon such a 
128. NEPA requires that a federal agency submit its FEIS to EPA and provide
at least a thirty-day notice-and-comment period from the time of publication in the 
Federal Register before the agency may make or record decision on the proposed 
action.  See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9 and 40 C.F.R. §1506.10(b)(2).    
129. Discussing its obligations under NEPA, the DEIS and FEIS differ in the
way each finishes the following statement: “Although the Secretary’s authority under 
Section 124 is ‘not withstanding any other provision of law, the Department has 
determined that . . . .”  The DEIS follows with, “it is appropriate to prepare an EIS and 
otherwise follow the procedures of NEPA.” DEIS, supra note 4, at iii (emphasis 
added).  Whereas the FEIS reads, “it is helpful to generally follow the procedures of 
NEPA.”  FEIS, supra note 68, at 2 (emphasis added).  
130. Salazar decision, supra note 9.
131. Id. at 5, fn. 4 (“Sec. 124 does not require me (or the NPS) to prepare a
DEIS or an [sic] FEIS or otherwise to comply with the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (NEPA) or any other law . . . .  Sec. 124 expressly exempts my decision 
from any substantive or legal requirements.”). 
132. Id., fn. 5 (“My decision today is based on the incompatibility of
commercial activities in wilderness and not on the [EIS] data that was asserted to be 
flawed.”). 
133. Id. at 1.
134. Salazar decision, supra note 9, at 5.
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politically sensitive subject years after its occurrence, when it was not the 
basis of the decision.  But the Park Service’s sloppy science, and the 
response of its officials, continues to be relevant in evaluating the final 
outcome of the controversy, as well as agency decision-making more 
broadly. 
One month after the Secretary issued his decision, Lunny challenged 
the decision in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under NEPA, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Fifth Amendment.135  Specifically, Lunny 
alleged that the Secretary’s interpretation of section 124 as relieving the 
agency of its NEPA obligations was “arbitrary and capricious” under section 
706 of the APA.136  Furthermore, Lunny claimed that, despite express 
statements to the contrary, the Secretary had relied on flawed data in the 
FEIS and therefore failed to base the decision on “best available science,” as 
he was obligated to do.137  The court disagreed that there had been reliance 
on flawed scientific data,138 and ultimately held that the decision was 
committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable under section 
701(a)(2) of the APA.139  
V. Scientific Misconduct: Definition and Response
The Solicitor of the Interior’s office investigated allegations of
scientific misconduct in a memorandum released to the public in 2011.140  It 
was then revealed that between 2007 and 2010, the Park Service had 
installed hidden cameras, without the knowledge of DBOC or the public, and 
collected nearly 300,000 photographs and detailed observational logs.141  
Seashore officials failed to turn over this data, which belied any evidence of 
harbor seal disturbances,142 to the NRC panel tasked with reviewing their 
135. Complaint at 6-7, Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et al., 2013 WL
451860 (No. 12-CV-06134-YGR)(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013). 
136. Id.
137. Id. at 20.
138. Drakes Bay Oyster Co., et al. v. Salazar, et al., 2013 WL 451860, *16 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 4, 2013.) 
139. Id. at *11.
140. DOI OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, PUBLIC REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC 
MISCONDUCT AT POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIFORNIA (Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter 
FROST REPORT], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?cs 
Module=security/getfile&pageid=238859. 
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 28.
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research during this time, or in response to Dr. Goodman’s FOIA request.143  
The officials justified this by explaining that they did not consider the 
camera surveillance system to be photographic research because the 
photographs lacked established methodology and quality controls.144  Frost 
questioned why, if this were true, the Park Service would continue the 
research program without improving research quality.145 Nonetheless, he 
determined that officials did intend to disclose the data.146  He found this 
intent on the basis of a briefing statement submitted to Regional Director 
Jon Jarvis three days before the NRC report was released to the public that 
included an attachment with three photographs.147  He therefore concluded, 
“NPS employees erred but did not misstep in any manner defined as 
criminal misconduct or scientific misconduct for which the agency could 
impose and successfully defend disciplinary action.”148 
The obvious question, then, is what actions are sufficient to constitute 
scientific misconduct?  The answer is found in the actor’s intent.  Scientific 
misconduct would arise in situations where:  
[I]ntentional acts produced a research record that did not
accurately represent information found in the photographic
data . . . . [Whereas] no scientific or research misconduct would 
exist if unintentional, negligent mishandling of the photographic 
data on and after those dates resulted in a research record that 
inaccurately represented the digital photos and related 
information.149  
This definition is consistent with other definitions of misconduct used 
within the executive and legislative branches.  In 2000, the President’s Office 
of Science and Technology Policy issued a unified policy applicable to all 
federal-research-grant recipients, which remains in effect today, defining 
research misconduct as “fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in 
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research 
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 28.
145. Id. at 31.
146. Id. at 29 (“[N]o NPS employee manipulated or intentionally omitted the
photographic research in an effort to defraud, deceive, or mislead any person or 
organization.”). 
147. Id. at 18 (describing the attachment, which included three photos taken
from one camera). 
148. Id. at 35.
149. Id. at 29.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
326 
results.”150  According to the National Academy of Sciences, fabrication 
consists of making up data or results, falsification means changing data or 
results, and plagiarism is using the ideas or words of another person 
without giving appropriate credit.151   
Many scholars have argued for a broader view of scientific integrity, 
one that encompasses more than the absence of overt fabrication, 
falsification, and plagiarism.152  To begin with, we must understand scientific 
misconduct in terms that encompass more shades of gray than what those 
three categories allow.  A key element in determining scientific misconduct 
on the part of the investigative bodies is false representation; that is, 
“reporting data that have not been observed or passing off for the 
observation of nature what is a product of one’s imagination”153—all of 
which requires intent to deceive. 
Frost’s report demonstrates, however, that a definition that hinges on 
the actor’s mental state will too often be difficult to prove and easy to 
manipulate.  The definition should be expanded to include a scientist’s 
failure to include contradictory data in a publicly released report, where he 
or she is shown to have had knowledge of its existence.  In such a case, 
failure to disclose seems reckless at best and intentional at worst—certainly 
beyond an act of negligence.  As long as scientific misconduct requires a 
finding of fraudulent intent, independent investigations into agency science 
may be vulnerable to conclusions that are, or appear to be, politically 
motivated.   
Assuming the best about the Solicitor’s findings—that is, there was 
insufficient proof that the Park Service’s conduct amounted to the legal 
standard of scientific misconduct—the agency unquestionably failed to live 
up to its own standard of scientific conduct.  By the time Frost conducted his 
investigation, the Park Service had released an Interim Code of Scientific 
and Scholarly Conduct, which did not exist at the time of the Sheltered 
Wilderness report.154  An early draft of the Code of Scientific and Scholarly 
Conduct was issued in 2004, but never actually finalized or formally applied 
to employees.155  The Interim Code of Scientific and Scholarly Conduct 
required all Park Service employees working with scientific information to: 
“process data from, and communicate the results of scientific and scholarly 
activities honestly, objectively, thoroughly, and expeditiously” and “fully 
150. Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity. 86 TEX L. REV 1601, 1066, fn.
128 (2008). 
151. NRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 5.
152. Doremus, supra note 150, at 1622.
153. GERALD DWORKIN, MORALITY, HARM, AND THE LAW 69 (1984).
154. FROST REPORT, supra note 140, at 9-10.
155. Id. at 10, fn. 8.
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disclose all research methods used [and] available data . . . in a timely 
manner and consistent with all laws and policy.”156  The Interim Guidance, 
now superseded by the formal policy on “Integrity of Scientific and Scholarly 
Activities,”157 became effective in January of 2008.158 
Publicly putting forth such a standard is an important first step in 
ensuring agency accountability.  Frost’s report stated that the Department 
“may address the mistakes and restore public trust by concluding that 
several NPS employees could and should have handled research differently 
and by modifying the future behavior of NPS employees with education and 
corrective action as deemed appropriate.”159  To that end, the Park Service 
issued the Clarification report discussed earlier, as well as an 
“Acknowledgement of Corrections,”160 stating that it had “incorrectly 
interpreted” the studies cited in its Wilderness report.  Such a gentle 
admission of error is not enough to restore public trust.   
Evidence that the issue is not yet moot is found in the Inspector 
General’s most recent investigation, released February 7, 2013, in response 
to allegations that the Park Service and its consultant had committed 
scientific misconduct in the DEIS.161  Specifically, it was alleged that Park 
Services officials had misrepresented soundscape data by using inaccurate 
proxies for DBOC equipment rather than taking on-site noise 
measurements.162  The Inspector General ultimately concluded there was no 
fraud, waste, abuse, or misrepresentation of data by researchers who found 
that DBOC boats had an impact on nearby harbor seals.163  As for the Park 
Service’s use of proxy data, the report stated it was “reasonable and justified 
156. Id. at 10 (discussing the “Interim Guidance Document Governing Code of
Conduct, Peer Review, and Information Quality Correction for National Park Service 
Cultural and Natural Resources Disciplines”). 
157. NAT’L PARK SERVICE, Director’s Order #79: Integrity of Scientific and
Scholarly Activities 2 (Sept. 19, 2012), fhttp://www.nps.gov/policy/Director’s_ 
Order_79.pdf; see also FROST REPORT, supra note 140, at 10, fn. 8. 
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 32.
160. NAT’L PARK SERV., Acknowledgment of corrections to previous versions of the Park
News document “Drakes Estero—A Sheltered Wilderness Estuary,” http://www.mmc.gov/ 
drakes_estero/pdfs/corr_nps_072507.pdf (last visited Feb. 28. 2013). 
161. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF DRAKES BAY OYSTER COMPANY
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/oig/ 
reports/upload/DrakesBayOysterCompany_Public.pdf.  While the report does not 
directly identify the complainant, it describes him as “an elected member of the 
National Academy of Sciences and adjunct professor at a California University.”  Id. at 2.  
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id.
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based on mechanical similarities” to DBOC equipment,164 especially given 
that “company noise emissions had never been named as having a potential 
impact on the environment or wildlife.”165  One wonders, then, why the Park 
Service bothered collecting, or even approximating such data from the 
beginning.  However, the Inspector General reported that the EIS was not 
viewed as a “scientific research paper,”166 and the Park Service need not 
collect new data for an EIS “unless there is a clear data gap.”167   
At the time that the Park Service issued the Sheltered Wilderness 
report, the DBOC had no entitlement to lease renewal, and the Department 
of the Interior had already taken the position that it had no such authority.168  
Nonetheless, Park Service officials no doubt anticipated that nonextension 
of the DBOC lease would create controversy and, in anticipation of public 
response, it may have released the report for the purpose of turning the 
public against continued DBOC operations.  In light of the difficult decision 
it faced, the agency was right to look to objective measures, including 
scientific study, to fully account for the costs and benefits of allowing DBOC 
to continue operating in what otherwise would be full wilderness.  The 
problem was that the Park Service used science to shield itself from 
exposing political judgments that would likely be unpopular in the local 
community.  Had the agency been subtler about its scientific claims, or had 
key community players not gotten involved, the tactic might have been 
successful in deflecting political pressure—but at what cost?   
VI. The Role of Science in the Secretary’s Decision
Though the Secretary acknowledged the “scientific uncertainty” and
“lack of consensus” surrounding the DBOC’s environmental impacts, he 
stated that the DEIS and FEIS “have informed me with respect to the 
complexities, subtleties, and uncertainties of this matter and have been 
helpful to me in making my decision.”169  Both the DEIS and the FEIS 
supported the proposition that removal of DBOC would provide long-term 
beneficial impacts to Drakes Estero.170  Furthermore, while section 124 would 
have allowed him to issue a new SUP regardless, it did not require him to, as 
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 37.
166. Id. at 24.
167. Id. at 10.
168. DOI Memo, supra note 8.
169. Salazar decision, supra note 9, at 5.
170. Id.
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section 124 “in no way overrides the intent of Congress as expressed in the 
1976 act to establish wilderness at the Estero.”171   
Despite the manifold criticism surrounding the Park Service’s 
allegations of DBOC’s deleterious impacts, my research has revealed 
nothing that would refute the only scientific claim relied upon in making the 
decision, which is that DBOC’s removal will have a long-term benefit on the 
Estero’s natural environment.172  It is far more difficult to prove that DBOC’s 
operations are ecologically harmful than it is to claim that its removal will 
be ecologically beneficial in the long-term.  It seems hard to refute as a 
matter of basic intuition and common sense, given the farm’s heavy shellfish 
output and the traffic it creates.  While the uncertain science has led to a 
series of prominent reviews by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009 
and again in 2012, the Marine Mammal Commission,173 the U.S. Geological 
Survey,174 and Atkins North America,175 these reports largely center on 
matters of methodology and magnitude.  They stress the uncertainty of the 
scientific analyses rather than provide new facts about which all parties can 
be certain.  Borrowing from the field of criminal law, one might say these 
peer reviews demonstrate that DBOC is “not guilty” of the ecological harm 
the Park Service had accused them of, but they prove nothing close to DBOC 
ecological “innocence.”   
The trouble is, however, that wilderness is actually a cultural concept 
rather than an ecological one.176  The Act’s description of land “untrammeled 
by man . . . retaining . . . primeval character and influence”177 reflects a 
conception of wilderness that is far more sociological than biological—a 
conviction to protect and preserve those few areas yet untouched by the 
destructive human hand.  From that standpoint, the conversion of Drakes 
Estero to full wilderness status in 2012 presented a political problem from 
171. Id. at 6.
172. Salazar decision, supra at 9, at 5 (“Although there is scientific uncertainty
and a lack of consensus in the record regarding the precise nature and scope of the 
impacts that DBOC’s operations have on wilderness resources, . . . the DEIS and FEIS 
support the proposition that the removal of DBOC’s operations in the estero would 
result in long-term beneficial impacts to the estero’s natural environment.”). 
173. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISION, MARICULTURE AND HARBOR SEALS IN DRAKES
ESTERO, CALIFORNIA (Nov. 22, 2011), http://mmc.gov/drakes_estero/welcome.html. 
174. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASSESSMENT OF PHOTOGRAPHS FROM WILDLIFE 
MONITORING CAMERAS IN DRAKES ESTERO, POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIFORNIA 
(Nov. 26, 2012), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2012/1249/pdf/OFR2012-1249.pdf. 
175. ATKINS REPORT, supra note 125.
176. Leshy, supra note 1, at 1-2 (describing the origins of today’s wilderness
movement). 
177. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
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the beginning.  As biologically important as Drakes Estero may be, it is 
simply not a place “untrammeled by man.”  However rural its landscape, it 
has not retained its “primeval character and influence.”  Worse yet, DBOC 
enjoyed a great deal of community support and a reputation as a local, even 
sustainable, food source.  The Point Reyes National Seashore was full of 
pristine locales already, and DBOC does not on first blush appear to be so 
different from the agricultural operations nearby.  The cultural case against 
DBOC—that is, for full wilderness designation—would have been hard to 
win, even in the left-leaning community of Point Reyes.  It is no surprise 
then that the Park Service turned to science to justify what would certainly 
be a politically unpopular decision, even if it considered the decision to be 
mandated by law.   
In some ways, the actions taken by the Park Service can be understood, 
perhaps even explained, by looking to the larger social and legal forces from 
which they sprang.  The Park Service found itself pressured by the increasing 
public expectation that sound science ought to be the major driver of 
regulatory decisions.178  The use of science in natural resource management 
ensures that the most precise and accurate information available is factored 
into decisions made by agencies in furtherance of societal goals.179  Not only 
does it assist decision-makers, but it also constrains them in limiting the 
exercise of discretion and guarding against anti-regulatory influences and 
interests.180  In other words, there are good reasons to insist that agencies 
make discretionary decisions in accordance with, or at least not in 
contravention of, clearly established scientific data.  But even if the Park 
Service properly felt it was accountable to the public for the scientific 
validity of its decisions, the manner in which it chose to meet that 
obligation not only threatened public confidence in the Park Service, but 
also in agency decision-making more broadly.  
Opponents of the lease renewal have argued that the critique of junk 
science is merely a red herring in the quest for wilderness protection.  In 
their estimation, Lunny and his supporters have cleverly inflated scientific 
uncertainties and exploited public perception in order to achieve an 
outcome that would otherwise have been impossible under the Wilderness 
Act as it has been applied by the Park Service and interpreted by the courts. 
The American public, acting through Congress, chose to create a national 
wilderness preservation system at the expense of local commercial interests, 
and it further chose to designate Drakes Bay as a place worthy of such 
178. Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of Transparency
in Natural Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS 158 (Wendy Wagner & 
Rena Steinzer eds., 2006). 
179. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural
Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
180. Id. at 4.
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protection.  The terms of the statute and the accompanying legislative 
reports reveal that it intended Drakes Estero to receive official wilderness 
status as soon as the 40-year lease expired, with very little room for agency 
discretion.  Both the Wilderness Act and the Point Reyes National Seashore 
wilderness designation were borne out of the democratic process, and after 
such intensive national deliberation, the goals reflected therein should be 
treated as controlling.   
Though these arguments are very compelling, it is nonetheless 
important to recognize that the end does not justify the means.  In fact, the 
means threaten the very end wilderness proponents seek to protect.  In this 
case, the “means” bear on the basic functionality of our representative 
government—the legitimacy of our political institutions, the trustworthiness 
of federal officials, and the willingness of community members to engage in 
the political process.  If land management agencies are permitted to use 
such tactics when we happen to approve of their overarching objective, there 
is nothing to protect against the same kind of tactics from being used in 
furtherance of an environmentally deleterious one.  In some ways, it is a 
good thing that the Park Service’s scientific methods were so lackluster 
because it has provided an opportunity to address the underlying problem 
of secretive data gathering and improper public presentation. Without such 
verifiably false scientific allegations, the harm would certainly manifest itself 
later when those same problematic practices were employed again with an 
inevitably less fortuitous result.  Thus, the Drakes Bay controversy provides 
what might be a rare opportunity to critique the agency’s decision-making 
process rather than its ultimate outcome.  
It is no coincidence that many American conservation heroes have 
historically been trained in the sciences.181  It is often thought, or hoped, 
that requiring agencies to base their regulatory decisions on science will 
tone down intense conflicts over the allocation of scarce natural 
resources.182  But as this case illustrates, it also has the potential to do just 
the opposite.  When scientific evidence is improperly collected and reported 
in an effort to support agency decision-making as it was here, what is at 
stake is not just passing public outrage, but lingering distrust.  Because 
science is often considered the arbiter of truth in the modern era, its misuse 
has profoundly detrimental impacts.  If we no longer trust science as a check 
on technically complex agency decision-making, what else do we have?  
The public distrust of the Park Service continues to manifest itself long 
after the original Sheltered Wilderness report and the cover-up that 
followed.  What is significant about the most recent Inspector General report 
181. For example, Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich, Aldo Leopold, Thomas
Lovejoy, Gifford Pinchot, George Perkins Marsh, John Muir, Norman Myers, Barry 
Commoner, and Edward O. Wilson. 
182. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 179, at 5.
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is that it confirms the real-world consequences of having lost the public’s 
confidence.  When science fails to provide these reassurances, we are left 
with internal watchdogs whose investigations necessarily occur behind 
closed doors.  There is no “peer review,” and thus, the value of their 
conclusions is limited by the trust we place in them.  Although the Office of 
the Inspector General is an entity distinct from the Park Service, whose 
purpose is to provide an independent voice,183 they are both housed within 
the Department of the Interior; therefore distrust of the former bleeds into 
the latter.  Thus, everyone suffers when agencies use science inappropriately 
in their decision-making—the public is left with no meaningful mechanism 
for reassurance and the government is left with no meaningful way to 
provide it.  The public will continue making allegations of misconduct, and 
the government in turn will spend precious tax dollars refuting them.  The 
problem is not just abstract or academic.  
Wilderness management is fundamentally different from most other 
legal mechanisms for natural resource protection.  Here, the wilderness 
management directives are unusually clear, and the law upon which it is 
based overwhelmingly favors preservation over commerce.184  The 
Wilderness Act is unlike other environmental statutes in that it does not 
place much emphasis on precision and accuracy.  Rather than providing for 
technical formulations, the Act is poetic in language and broad in 
application.  The statute includes far-reaching prohibitions on commercial 
enterprise with limited exceptions made to accommodate historical use and 
allow for the basic necessities of wilderness management,185 to the extent 
necessary for “realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the 
area.”186  Regardless of how one sees DBOC—at best, the provider of a 
sustainable food source, a historical relic of the area’s maricultural 
traditions, even an integral part of visitors’ recreational enjoyment—it does 
not fall into the Act’s allowable exceptions.  Although Congress did not 
explicitly dictate in the Act that that these prohibitions apply equally to 
potential wilderness areas, it did clearly express such intent in its 
accompanying reports.  Like all issues involving congressional intent, there 
may be some room for leeway, but in the long run, DBOC would have to go. 
There might have been good reasons to extend the lease, but an 
additional ten years would only have prolonged the acrimonious debate. 
The scientific basis of the Secretary’s decision, as well as the administrative 
183. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 6 (a).
184. See Wilderness Soc’ty v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 353 F.3d 1051, 162
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (rejecting the idea that the Wilderness Act intended to strike 
a balance between interests). 
185. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (allowing for commerce necessary to control
disease, fire, and insects). 
186. Id. at § 1133(c)(5).
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actions that preceded it, remain the source of great controversy.  No doubt 
more scientific reports and expert testimony will be generated in the course 
of the litigation following it.  But science will not provide the definitive 
answer to the case, nor will it in the wilderness management decisions of 
the future.  Rather, judicial precedent and national wilderness policy will 
circumscribe these decisions, so long as the statutory scheme and agency 
management policies remain as they are.  In the meantime, our political 
decision-makers must use careful analysis, subject to peer review, to inform 
value-laden decisions, not disguise them.  Thus, the Secretary’s decision is to 
be applauded insofar as it openly accounted for the difficult political 
judgments made in reaching it.  And for those who would like more 
flexibility in wilderness management to allow local food producers on such 
lands, we must look to our congressional representatives to properly drive 
that change.  
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